Introducing and Terminating External Incentives: A Field Experimental Study of Forest Conservation as a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma

Nils Christian Hoenow, Michael Kirk

The aim of this study is to analyze whether external institutional incentives have a lasting effect on conservation that persists even after incentives are terminated. We set up a forestry-framed common-pool resource game in Namibia and introduced positive (reward) and negative (fee) incentives that aimed to increase cooperation. The participants in the game were small-scale farmers and they had to make decisions about either clearing new fields in the forest or staying on their old ones, which resembles decisions they make in real life. The game was played over several periods and the incentives were ceased after some time to test for persisting effects in a post-incentive period. Results show that increases in cooperation persist after termination of negative incentives. After termination of positive incentives, cooperation decreased, albeit not significantly. We also find that cooperation increased over time in a control group that had never received additional incentives.

Event: Land Governance in an Interconnected World_Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty_2018

Document type:Introducing and Terminating External Incentives: A Field Experimental Study of Forest Conservation as a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma (1231 kB - pdf)