Bargaining Power and Inheritance Norms: Evidence from Polygamous Households in Nigeria
Jennifer Golan, Alessia Isopi
We investigate the interaction between inheritance norms and women’s bargaining power in determining child labor supply across siblings. With child labor improving the household’s future inheritable assets, we develop a theoretical model to capture bargaining power dynamics within complex household structures. Our results suggest that mothers’ relative bargaining power increases children’s labour supply, especially when inheritance norms assign a greater share to the mother’s child. Using data from Nigeria and the variation in mothers’ bargaining power and inheritance norms, we find that children of the more powerful mother work more than children of other mothers within polygamous households. This result is more pronounced for boys, landed households and when first wives can directly increase their returns to future inheritance.
Event: World Bank Land Conference 2024 - Washington
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